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STATE OF NEW YORK
SUPREME COURT

COUNTY OF ALBANY

In The Matter of ANTHONY SMITH, 89-A-6874,
Petitioner,
-againstNEW YORK STATE DIVISION OF PAROLE,
Respondent,
For A Judgment Pursuant to Article 78
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules.

Supreme Court Albany County Article 78 Term
Hon. George B. Ceresia, Jr., Supreme Court Justice Presiding
RJI ## 01-1 1-ST2363 Index No. 638-1 1
Appearances:

Anthony Smith
Inmate No. 89-A-6874
Petitioner, Pro Se
Fishkill Correctional Facility
P.O. Box 307
Beacon, NY 12508
Eric T. Schneiderman
Attorney General
State of New York
Attorney For Respondent
The Capitol
Albany, New York 12224
(Brian J. u'Uonnell,
Assistant Attorney General
of Counsel)
DECISION/ORDER/JUDGMENT

George B. Ceresia, Jr., Justice

The petitioner, an inmate at Fishkill Correctional Facility, has commenced the instant
CPLR Article 78 proceedin? to review a determination of respondent dated November 10,
2009 to deny petitioner discretionary release on parole. Petitioner is serving a term of fifteen
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(1 5 ) years to life upon conviction (after plea) of kidnaping in the first degree. Among the

arguments set forth in the petition, the petitioner contends that the Parole Board’s decision
does not give the petitioner guidance in adjusting his future behavior in order to gain parole,
the court failed to consider the liberty interest in the expectation of early release, the denial
of parole was improperly based on the same criteria as the sentencing hearing, thus
subjecting the petitioner to Double Jeopardy and violating collateral estoppel, the Board
relied on erroneous facts in making its determination, the Board’s decision was predetermined, the board did not give appropriate weight to petitioner’s status as a re-appearing
parole candidate or his institutional record, and the twenty-four (24) month hold placed on
petitioner was excessive.
The reasons for the respondent’s determination to deny petitioner release on parole
are set forth as follows:
“After a review of the record and interview, the Panel has
determined that if released at this time your release would be
incompatible with the welfare of society and would so deprecate
the serious nature of the crime as to undermine respect for the
law. This decision is based on the following factors: Your
instant offense is kidnaping 1’‘ Degree, for which you are
serving 15 to life. The crime involved you and others abducting
a victim in a shoppiIig wntci’pihing lut dt guriyuinr, dmariding
ransom money and repeatedly raping her. The Board notes your
letters of support, letter of employment and positive program
evaluation. More compelling, however, is the brutal and vicious
nature of the instant offense and your callous disregard for the
physical and emotional well-being for the victim. As such, your
release at this time is inappropriate.”
As stated in Executive Law 52594 (2) (c) (A):
“Discretionary release on parole shall not be granted merely as
a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties
while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable
probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and
2
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remain at liberty without violating the law, and that his release
is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so
deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect
for law. In making the parole release decision, the guidelines
adopted pursuant to subdivision four of section two hundred
fifty-nine-c of this article shall require that the following be
considered: (i) the institutional record including program goals
and accomplishments, academic achievements, vocational
education, training or work assignments, therapy and
interpersonal relationships with staff and inmates; (ii)
performance, if any, as a participant in a temporary release
program; (iii) release plans including community resources,
employment, education and training and support services
available to the inmate; (iv) any deportation order issued by the
federal government against the inmate [I; (v) any statement
made to the board by the crime victim or the victim’s
representative [I” (Executive Law $2594 [2] [c] [A]).
Parole Release decisions are discretionary and, if made pursuant to statutory
requirements, not reviewable (Matter of De La Cruz v Travis, 10 AD3d 789 [3d Dept.,
20041; M a t w ul‘C‘ul1i.A L h c u 1 ’ v Abrttic L3ir.ihiun of Parole, 287 AD2d 921 [3d Dept.,
200 11). Furthermore, only a “showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety” on the part

of the Parole Board has been found to necessitate judicial intervention (see Matter of Silmon
v Travis, 95 NY2d 470, 476 [2000], quoting Matter of Russo v. New York State Bd. of
Parole, 50 NY2d 69,77 [ 19801). In the absence of the above, there is no basis upon which
to disturb the discretionary determination made by the Parole Board (see Matter of Perez v.
New York State of Division of Parole, 294 AD2d 726 [3rd Dept., 20021).
The Court finds that the Parole Board considered the relevant criteria in making its
decision and its determination was supported by the record. A review of the transcript of the
parole interview reveals that, in addition to the instant offense, attention was paid to such
factors as petitioner’s institutional pragramming and his plans upon release. The decision
was sufficiently detailed to inform the petitioner of the reasons for the denial of parole and
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it satisfied the requirements of Executive Law $259-i (see Matter of Siao-Pao, 1 1 NY3d 773

[2008]; Matter of Whitehead v. Russi, 201 AD2d 825 [3rd Dept., 19941; Matter of Green v.
New York State Division of Parole, 199 AD2d 677 [3rd Dept., 19931).
Petitioner's argument that the Parole Board is required to advise petitioner andor
provide guidance with regard to the programs he should take, or rehabilitative efforts he
should engage in to increase his chance for release at a future parole interview has no merit

(seeExecutive Law 5 2594 [2] [a]; 9 NYCRR 5 8002.3; Boothe v Hammock, 605 F2d 661
[2ndCir, 19791; Matter of Freeman v New York State Division of Parole, 2 1 AD3d 1174 [3'd
Dept., 20051).
It is proper and, in fact, required, that the Parole Board consider the seriousness of the
inmate's crimes and their violent nature (E Matter of Weir v. New York State Division of
Parole, 205 AD2d 906,907 [3rd Dept., 19941; Matter of Sinopoli v New York State Board

of Parole, 189 AD2d 960, supra; Matter of Dudley v Travis, 227 AD2d 863, [3rd Dept.,
1996), as well as the inmate's criminal history (see Matter of Farid v Travis, 239 AD2d 629
[3rd Dept., 19971; Matter of Cohen v Gonzalez, 254 AD2d 556 [3rd Dept., 19981). The
Parole Board is not required to enumerate or give equal weight to each factor that it
considered in determining the inmate's application, or to expressly discuss each one (see
Matter of Young; v New York Division of Parole, 74 AD3d 1681 [3rdDept., June 24,20101;
Matter of Wise v New York State Division of Parole, 54 AD3d 463 [3rdDept., 20081). Nor
must the parole board recite the precise statutory language set forth in the first sentence of
Executive Law

5 2594 (2) (c) (A) (gMatter of Silvero v Dennison, 28 AD3d 859 [3rd

Dept., 20061).

In other words, "[wlhere appropriate the Board may give considerable

weight tu, or place particular emphasis on, the circumstances of the crimes for which a
4
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petitioner is incarcerated, as well as a petitioner’s criminal history, together with the’other
statutory factors, in determining whether the individual ‘will live and remain at liberty
without violating the law,’ whether his or her ‘release is not incompatible with the welfare
of society,’ and whether release will ‘deprecate the seriousness of [the] crime as to
undermine respect for [the] law”’ (Matter nfpiirio v New Yor-k-S_tteJivision of Parole, 3
AD3d 816 [3rd Dept., 20041, quoting Executive Law $259-i [2] [c] [A], other citations
omitted).
Petitioner’s claims that the determination to deny parole is tantamount to a resentencing, in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clauses’s prohibition against multiple
punishments are conclusory and without merit (see Matter of Bockeno v New York State
Parole Board, 227 AD2d 75 1 [3rdDept., 19961; Matter of Crews v New York State Executive
DeDartment Board of Appeals Unit, 281 AD2d 672 [3rdDept., 20011; Matter of Evans v
Dennison, 13 Misc3d 1236A, [Sup. Ct., Westchester Co., 20061). The fact that an inmate has
served his or her minimum sentence does not confer upon the inmate a protected liberty
interest in parole release (see Matter of Motti v Alexander, 54 AD3d 1114, 11 15 [3rdDept.,
20081). The Parole Board is vested with the discretion to determine whether release was
appropriate notwithstanding the fact that the sentencing court set the minimum term of
petitioner’s sentence (see Matter of Silmon v Travis, 95 NY2d 470,476 [2000]; Mrrtter of
Codv v Denniscn, 33 AD2d 1141, 1 142 [3rdDept., 20061 lv denied 8 NY3d 802 [2007];

Matter of Burress v D e n ~ c g37
, AD3d 930 [3rdDept., 20073).
With regard to the Parole Board’s failure to consider the minutes of petitioner’s
sentencing (as required under Executive Law 259-i [2] [c] [A] Imt sentencc, which mako
reference to the provisions of Executive Law 8 259-i [ 11 [a]), it is now well settled that this
5
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does not mandate a new hearing where, as here, the minutes are not available for review,
after a diligent search has been made to obtain them (seeMatter of Freeman v Alexander, 65
AD3d 1429, [3rdDept., 20091; Matter of Blasich v New York State Divisinn of Parole, 68
AD3d 1339, 1340-134 1 [3rdDept., 20091; see a!o:

Matter of Lebron v Alexander, 68 AD3d

1476, 1477 [3'd Dept., 20091 [Held: where the Parole Board is unable to consider the
sentencing minutes a favorable presumption does not arise]; Matter of Andren v Aleumdey,
72 AD3d 1 178 [3'd Dept., 20 lo]). In this instance, the respondent has submitted the affidavit

of Jerri Krevoff, Chief Court Reporter of Nassau County Court, who avers that the Court
Reporter who took the sentencing minutes is no longer in the employ of the court system, and
that despite a diligent search, her notes cannot be found. Under the circumstances, the failure
to consider petitioner's sentencing minutes does not serve as grounds to annul the parole
determination. Apart from the foregoing, a review of the plea taken on April 3,1989 reveals
that County Court Judge Abbey L. Boklan indicated that as part of the plea agreement he
would take no position with respect to petitioner's release when the petitioner came before
the Parole Board.
With respect to petitioner's argument that he has served time in excess ofthe parole
guideline range (see, 9 NYCRR 800 I .3), the guidelines "are intended only as a guide, and
are not a substitute for the careful consideration of the many circumstances of each
individual case'' (see,9 NYCRR 8001.3 [a]; Matter of Tatta v State of New York Division
of Parole, 290 AD2d 907, 908 [3rd Dept., 20021; Matter of Rodriguez v Evans, 82 AD3d
1397 [3d Dept., 20 11I). Thus, the Court finds that this does not serve as a basis to overturn
the Board's decision.
With regard to the petitioner's claim that the Parole Board relied on erroneous

6
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information that he was convicted of raping the victim of the instant offense, the Court finds
this argument to be without merit. The transcript of the parole interview clearly reveals that
the Parole Board was aware that kidnaping first degree is the only offense to which petitioner
pleaded guilty. The questioning during the parole interview regarding the rape of his victim
is a result of the Board’s proper consideration of information contained in petitioner’s
presentence investigation report (E Matter of Cox v New York State Division of Parole, 1 1
AD3d 766,767-768 [3rd Dept., 20041; Matter of Carter v Evans, 8 1 AD3d 1031 [3rd Dept.,
201 11). Additionally, the petitioner admitted the rape during the parole interview, saying,
“I’m deeply regretful to [the victim’s] father [I and her family for my callous behavior toward
her. I am a father and a grandfather now. I have a 21-year-old daughter and two
granddaughters. If someone was to kidnap and rape them, as I did to [the victim], I would
feel deep pain, disgust, anger, helplessness and sorrow, knowing that there was nothing I can
do to help them.” Petitioner also said, “I objectified (sic) and I had no respect for women.
I viewed women as sex objects. In looking back now, I raped [the victim] long before I
crossed her path that day because of my thoughts and my views.” In considering the
presentence investigation report and the petitioner’s own statements at the hearing, the Parole
Board did not base their determination upon erroneous facts and/or a misapprehension of the
facts.
The Court has reviewed petitioner’s remaining arguments and contentions and finds
them to be without merit.
The Court finds the decision of the Parole Board was not irrational, in violation of
lawful procedure, affected by an error of law, irrational or arbitrary and capricious. The
petition must therefore be dismissed.

7
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The Court observes that certain records of a confidential nature relating to the
petitioner were submitted to the Court as a part of the record. The Court, by separate order,
is sealing all records submitted for in camera review.
Accordingly, it is

ORDERED and ADJUDGED, that the petition be and hereby is dismissed.
This shall constitute the decision, order and judgment of the Court. The original
decision/order/judgment is returned to the attorney for the respondents. All other papers are
being delivered by the Court to the County Clerk for filing.

The signing of this

decision/order/judgment and delivery of this decision/order/judgment does not constitute
entry or filing under CPLR Rule 2220. Counsel is not relieved from the applicable
provisions of that rule respecting filing, entry and notice of entry.

ENTER
Dated:

F

June 39,2010
Troy, New York
George B. Ceresia, Jr.

Papers Considered:
1.
Order To Show Cause dated February 3,20 1 1, Petition, Supporting Papers and
Exhibits
Respondent’s Answer dated April 8,20 1 1, Supporting Papers and Exhibits
2.
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